Friday, May 16, 2008

Essays on I Thess. 2.7-12 (Part 1)

The next few posts will be a series of excerpts from a paper I wrote for my Pauline Epistles III class titled: A Defense of Paul’s Ministry of Christ-like Faithfulness and Love Portrayed in the Images of I Thessalonians 2.7-12.

Framing the Passage

Upon a cursory study of 1 Thessalonians 2 it would seem that Paul is giving an apologia for his ministry, defending its nature and character.[1] Typically, this is understood as a defense against comparisons to wandering moralist teachers in search of money, fame, and power at the expense of gullible devotees.[2] But, Abraham Malherbe argues that the chief intention of the passage is paranetic; that is, an example of the way that ministers of the gospel should behave.[3] And while Malherbe is correct in his assessment that this passage does not necessitate specific opponents in Thessalonica, casting the passage as mere rhetorical function seems to be inappropriate.

In place of either of these options Gene Green offers that the primary reason for Paul’s vindication of his actions was to acquit himself of accusations leveled from within the church because of his forced sudden departure of the city.[4] It is this situation in light of the dubious behavior of the popular philosophers and moral teachers that Paul is writing from. This is supported contextually by the explanation Paul gives for not returning (2.17-20), his explanation of the measures he took to strengthen the church in their persecution (3.1-5), and his expression to see the church again (3.6-12).[5]

Each of these positions holds its strengths, but there is no reason to assume that the text is offering a solution to only one of these problems. Green says, “In the end, due to the intimate relationship between Paul and the message he preached, what was at stake was not simply the message of the Christian messenger among the believers but rather the Thessalonians continuation in the faith.” In fact, as Paul clarifies the nature of his ministry in light of the culture around him he also offers his ministry as “an example of Christ-like faithfulness and love.”[6] In this way 1 Thess. 2 should be viewed both as an apologetic for Paul and his team as well as a paranetic of what it means to be conformed to Christ in every day life, of which both paradigms are provided for under the paternal image of Paul that is presented in 2.7-12.


[1] Simpson, J.W. “Letters to the Thessalonians,” Dictionary of Paul and His Letters (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 936.

[2] Bruce, F.F. 1 & 2 Thessalonians (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1982), 26.

[3] Malherbe, Abraham J. Ap 1970. Gentle as a nurse: the Cynic background to 1 Thess 2. Novum Testamentum. 12 (2):203-217.

[4] It should be noted that included in the address of the letter was Sylvaus and Timothy. However, Paul is commonly held to be the one writing the letter (for further discussion see Simpson, 937). Thus, when Paul is referenced in terms of what is said in the letter to the Thessalonians, Sylvanus and Timothy may also be inferred, though it is not found to be necessary to include them in every mention of the author or his intentions.

[5] Green, Gene L. The Letters to the Thessalonians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 114. Green understands chapters 2 and 3 to be a cohesive unit and can thus argue for the continuity of thought between both.

[6] Gorman, Michael J. Apostle of the Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to Paul and His Letters (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 154-55. Gorman says, “The language of selfless, accommodating behavior is at the core of Paul’s self understanding of his apostleship, for in relinquishing a right for the welfare of others, he reenacts the story of Christ who chose not to exploit his equality with God but emptied himself (Phil. 2:6-8).

Tuesday, May 13, 2008

Feuerbach: Part 3

In light of Feuerbach’s anthropocentric theology the church should mimic the proclamation of John the Baptist as he says:

The one who comes from above is above all; the one who is from the earth belongs to the earth, and speaks as one from the earth. The one who comes from heaven is above all. He testifies to what he has seen and heard, but no one accepts his testimony. The man who has accepted it has certified that God is truthful. For the one whom God has sent speaks the words of God, for God gives the Spirit without limit. The Father loves the Son and has placed everything in his hands. Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life, but whoever rejects the Son will not see life, for God's wrath remains on him (John 3:31-36, NIV).

May our prayer to Him who is transcendent over all be that He become greater even as we ourselves are reduced, that the world may see His good work and glorify our Father who is in heaven (John 3.30).

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Feuerbach's Misinterpretation of Augustine: Part 2

Pelagianism and Augustinianism compared

As Feuerbach continues to make his case for his projection theology, he argues for the classic liberal notion of belief in the inherent goodness of humankind. Indeed, he must make such an argument; for without the idea that man in his essence is good, none of Feuerbach’s ensuing thought would be possible. It would be utterly illogical for him to argue for the “ultimate good” to be a projection of a decadent humanity.

Upon establishing that is sin a contradiction of the absolute considered as another being, and therefore having no meaning Feuerbach turns indirectly to a discussion of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. Rather than offer an outright refutation of Augustine’s arguments, he instead attempts to compare the Augustinian understanding of the depravity of man with the Pelagian doctrine that man is essentially good. But instead of finding the two to be opposed Feuerbach argues that both doctrines concerning the human beings moral nature vindicate the essential goodness of man; Augustinianism by means of religion and Pelagianism by means of rationalism.[1]

It almost seems ridiculous that Feuerbach would attempt to unify the two opposing doctrines of original sin. They possess fundamentally opposite presuppositions and are built off of completely distinct conceptions as to the nature of humanity. Feuerbach thought he could do so because of the nature of his anthropologically oriented theology. He undertook this mode of argumentation because if it is right and he is able to reduce these two opposing views into a single conclusion, then he is able to build a case for his projection God by making the “notion of God dependent on the notion of activity, or rather human activity, for he knows of none higher.”[2] This is possible according to Feuerbach because Pelagianism is reduced to forcing man into action and Augustinianism is reduced to forcing God into action, which means that God must either be completely passive or that he must act morally; and as has already been stated that if morally, then humanly.

Feuerbach then cites Augustine’s refutation of the Pelagian doctrine in “On Nature and Grace.” Feuerbach quotes Augustine, “Pelagianism denies God” because, he says, “It has only the Creator, i.e., Nature, as a basis, not the Saviour, the true God of the religious sentiment… it denies God… it elevates man into a God since it makes him a being not needing God.”[3] Feuerbach then inverts this reasoning for Augustinianism saying, “Augustinianism denies man; but, as a consequence of this, it reduces God to the level of man, even to the ignominy of the cross, for the sake of man.”[4] Using either of these systems will warrant the same conclusion; the idea that either man is God or God is man. Indeed, Feuerbach goes on to say, “What a man declares concerning God, he in truth declares concerning himself.”[5] Then, thinking his argument complete he says, “…so long as a man adores a good being as his God, so long does he contemplate in God the goodness of his own nature.”[6]

But this is not at all the meaning that Augustine intended. When he critiqued Pelagianism and declared that “Pelagianism denies God” he did not mean that this denial literally cause man to ascend to godhood based upon his lack of need for a God figure. Instead he was referring to the fact that as Pelagianism denied the depravity of man he also denied the need for a Savior. Once Christ’s atoning work on the cross is reduced to example it becomes the responsibility of the individual to achieve the moral perfection God requires to enter into relationship with him. What is left is a works based system of salvation, which violates the biblical text (Eph. 2:8-9).

Counter to Feuerbach’s inferences, Augustine’s doctrine of the total depravity of man does not encourage the believer to live a life of complete religious non-action. As has already been demonstrated Augustine is concerned with redemptive living as he strives towards participation in God and the pinnacle of existence as the “greatest good.” This basic understanding of Christianity opposes Feuerbach’s interpretation and attempted synthesis of his thought with Pelagianism.

Based upon the situation of this passage in Feuerbach’s larger manifesto it seems as though this discussion were almost unnaturally inserted. There is no evidence to warrant this notion, however it would fit if Feuerbach is trying to provide his new thought with frames that people will easily recognize and understand.

Saint Augustine has been a pillar for Western theology for centuries, and as such his work has been oft called upon to lend credence to the ideas of numerous subsequent theologians and religious thinkers. Feuerbach’s treatment of the Augustinian text is certainly a unique example of this. However, Feuerbach fails to take into account his own certain presuppositions; those being, that humanity is essentially good, that the senses are the way that we validate existence, and that notions of God must be reflective of humanity.



[1] Feuerbach, 28.

[2] Feuerbach, 29.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

Feuerbach's Misinterpretation of Augustine: Part 1

This paper will show that Feuerbach misinterprets Augustine, ignoring the literary and philosophical context from which he pulls the passages and foists his own presuppositions about the nature of humanity and existence onto the Augustinian text. This will be accomplished by providing an understanding of the nature of Feuerbach’s arguments and subsequently, critically examining Feuerbach’s use of the Augustinian texts in light of their original context.

Mans knowledge of and relation to the Divine

Feuerbach embarks on an attempt to show that the relationship between subject and object or between the individual and that which the individual senses or perceives is really nothing more than the subject’s objectification of himself. Feuerbach says, “…the object of any subject is nothing else than the subject’s own nature taken objectively.”[1]

He begins this argument by drawing a contrast between the consciousness of object and self in terms of the senses and this same consciousness in terms of religion. He says that when dealing with consciousness in and the senses one is easily able to distinguish between the consciousness of the self and that of the object. But when speaking in terms of religion “…consciousness of the object and self-consciousness coincide.”[2] This is so because Feuerbach says that while the object of the senses is outside of the man, the religious object is within the man himself.

It is here that Feuerbach inserts Augustine to assist in making his point. He makes the claim that being within us and a part of us, our own self-consciousness is easier to know even than those things which can be observed even by sensory perception. He quotes Augustine saying, “God… is nearer, more related to us, and therefore more easily known by us than sensible, corporeal things.”[3] Then, having previously established the difference between the object of the senses and the object of religion and having marked the relation of the self to the object of religion as dually more significant and easier to cognize, Feuerbach is able to arrive at a basis for his conclusion that there is “…a discrimination between the divine and the non-divine, between that which is worthy of adoration and that which is not worthy.”[4]

Once this presupposition has been established then religion, or the consciousness of God becomes the self-consciousness of man. What we take away from this twofold. First, the groundwork is laid upon the subject/object relationship for understanding self existence in terms of the subjects predicate, that those qualities or the essence of the subject (the predicate) is the foundation for the existence of the subject. The reality of the predicate becomes the sole guarantee of existence, and it is founded upon the subject’s ability to sense and perceive. Second, the nature of the divine, being seen as the projection of mans own notions of himself is also recognized to be known strictly in terms of anthropomorphic language, a fact which Feuerbach uses to further his case that God exists in man, as man, based upon the idea that man can only conceive of a “greater being” in terms of himself.

Having grasped the anthropological thrust of Feuerbach’s argument, it can now be examined in light of the very passage that Feuerbach used to buttress his line of reasoning. The passage that Feuerbach quoted from is a passage from Augustine’s commentary On Genesis. It is a section that is only three paragraphs long, but it provides enough material to seriously inquire into Feuerbach’s treatment of it.

Feuerbach quotes Augustine as saying, “God… is nearer, more related to us, and therefore more easily known by us than sensible, corporeal things.”[5] According to Feuerbach, Augustine is saying that God is more easily understood by the human self than are sensual and corporeal things because his nature is such that it is closer to our nature than anything that can be perceived through the senses.[6] For Feuerbach this is achieved as the subject self objectifies certain desirable “attributes” such as absolute love, justice, or mercy and projects them as the essence of the conceptual religious object, thus making these qualities the religious object. Then, the religious object, the essence of which is attributed to one’s own sense of behavioral idealism becomes an extension or a projection of the self, the subject.

This seems to be a mistranslation at the very least, but it is more likely that Feuerbach was casting his new and radical ideas in language that was traditional, orthodox, and therefore acceptable. He was kicked out of his teaching post at Erlangen, banned from any use of the facilities at the University of Heidelberg where he had once studied, and was leading a small fanatical political faction in favor of the revolution sweeping across Europe called the Young Hegelians. Consequently, his ideas were often looked upon with suspicion.[7] Perhaps Feuerbach’s use of Augustine stems from an attempt to make his revolutionary ideas more socially palatable by providing them with an acceptable historic anchor.

According to the translation put out by New City Press this same passage is translated, “God is nearer to us than are many of the things he made. For in him we live and move and are (Acts 17:28), while most of these things are remote from the human mind on account of their dissimilarity in kind, being corporeal.”[8] This passage is a part of a discussion focused upon our relationship to God as humans as compared with the rest of creation and its relationship to God; not, as Feuerbach uses it, to prove that the sensing of the “religious object” by the self, while remaining a “sensed” phenomenon does not behave as a “religious object” but instead as a “religious predicate” which is ultimately understood as the projection of the ideal self.

In fact, the context of the passage seems to imply that some of those “substances” Augustine mentions, while being “sensible or corporeal things” in that they are physical and able to be sensed seem to also include the things in the far reaches of the universe – things which are “corporeal” but not necessarily able to be sensed. Towards the end of the passage Augustine says, “…it is incomparably more satisfying and worthwhile for the devout mind to come into the slightest contact with him, then for it to comprehend the whole universe.”[9] This understanding is furthered as he makes specific reference to these “substances” as being “remote from our bodily senses… cut off from observation” and the fact that “we do not see them with the senses of the body.”[10]

Feuerbach’s use of this passage ignores the primary message Augustine is communicating. God is relationally closer to us than the rest of his creation because our existence is realized in him, as opposed to the rest of creation, which though we may be situated in close proximity to it we do not find that our existence is at all tied to it. In this way we have a special bond with God that we do not experience with the rest of his created work. This is on account, Augustine says, “of their dissimilarity in kind [to us as human beings], being corporeal;” but not only being “corporeal”, because as the human being was created in the image of God so we share in some way a nature similar to God, albeit one that has been corrupted and can only represent at best a fragmented mosaic of that divine image and nature.

As if to compound his transgression Feuerbach edited out what is the central phrase in Augustine’s statement “For in him we live and move and are”. This phrase is the crux of Augustine’s concept of existence – that we not only exist in God, but that we also subsist in him.[11] But to make the passage fit his own ontology, Feuerbach casts aside this notion of an existence dependant upon an outside entity. In its place he constructs the sentence so as to assume his own subject/predicate interplay, as he finds the individuals existence validated by his senses.

Where Feuerbach sees mans existence validated by the conscious interaction that is produced when a man (subject) perceives something as an object, Augustine looks to establish existence in God as the greatest good.[12] In doing so he does, as Feuerbach would accuse him, discriminate between the divine and the non-divine. But this distinctness between the Creator God and his created creature is for Augustine the place where the human finds existence, identity, and knowledge. In fact, according to Augustine, apart from God the human would be nothing, a non-existence. In this way God is scene as the defining factor of existence, and because of God’s status as the greatest good, the idea of existence becomes an inherently good thing.[13]



[1] Feuerbach, Ludwig, The Essence of Christianity, Translated by George Eliot (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1989), 12.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., 12.

[6] Where God is perhaps better understood as religious object.

[7] Harvey, Van A, “Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 31, 2007, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/ (accessed May 4, 2007).

[8] Augustine, On Genesis, Translated by Edmund Hill, v. 13 “The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century” (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press), 293.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Augustine, Exposition of Psalms, Translated by Maria Boulding, v. 20“The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century” (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press), 19. “No human being is in his or her own right, for we are inconstant and subject to change, unless we participate in Him who is the Selfsame. A human being truly is when he sees God. He is when he sees Him Who Is, for, in seeing Him Who Is, the creature too comes to be in his measure.”

[12] Feuerbach, xv. Feuerbach is blatant in this rejection. He says, “This philosophy has for its principle, not the Substance of Spinoza, not the ego of Kant and Fichte, not the Absolute Identity of Schelling, not the Absolute Mind of Hegel… but a real being, the true Ens realissimum – man.”

[13] Charry, Ellen T. Review of Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, by Philip Cary, Theology Today, July, 2001.

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Introduction and Summary to Feuerbach's Thought

In the course of the next week I hope to post extracts from two papers that I am currently writing. The first will be a discussion of Ludwig Feuerbach and his "religious atheism" and what that means for orthodox Christianity. The second will be a short thesis which will examine Feuerbach's understanding of Augustine's conception of God and the self in relation to God in light of Augustine's actual work. So, as a precursor I decided to do a quick sketch on Feuerbach outlining his thought which will hopefully provide enough background to understand these further explorations into Feuerbach.


In his Lectures on the Essence of Religion Ludwig Feuerbach makes the statement, “Theology is anthropology.” This declaration essentially sums up the whole of Feuerbach’s postulations on religion, which says that ‘theos’ or ‘God’ is “…nothing other than the essence of man.” He illustrates this point by saying that the different nature of different gods in different religions and social settings is nothing more than a varied reflection of peoples differing imaginations and dispositions on both an individual and collective level. Our gods are our ideals for humanity which we have mistakenly separated from ourselves and given divine status to. In this way Feuerbach becomes an extension of Hegel’s theology that creation remains a part of the creator, while the creator remains greater than the creation as he claims that religion is an outward projection of mans inner nature

For Feuerbach, religion is nothing more than a social construct that has been introduced into society as a means of coercing one’s fellow man. It has been used from age to age by those in positions of power to dominate men of ignorance and unformed intelligence and keep them living in fear of something greater, which in reality was nothing more than what their own imaginations would allow them to conjure up at the power of subtle suggestion. It is this idea of religion and this brand of atheism that would later influence the philosophies of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (though they ultimately rejected his materialistic inconsistency).

Feuerbach states that his primary concern “…has been to illumine the obscure essence of religion with the torch of reason, in order that man may at least cease to be the victim… of all those hostile powers which… are still employing the darkness of religion for the oppression of mankind.” He attempts to argue for this by showing the depravity of human religion – namely in mentioning human sacrifice. In making this argument he hopes to free society of the constraints that have been placed upon it for the future. Feuerbach believes that this “misunderstood” religion has been the driving force behind politics and ethics and says that if a future generation can come to a proper understanding of the nature of religion then it will “... determine the destinies of mankind.”

By taking such an anthropological view of religion Feuerbach helps to build the bridge from liberal deistic theological speculation to an atheism that is expressed in religious language. In presenting organized religion in such a skeptical manner dealt a significant blow to the church. While initially being viewed as radical, eventually it popularized forms of atheism and gave people a “reasonable” explanation for the existence of religion (as well as a rationale for dismissing it.) Unfortunately over the course of history there are many examples of religion that used as tool for monopolizing power over people. One must only remember the way in which Constantine used Christianity to bind his newly gained empire to recognize that there is enough truth in Feuerbach’s conception of humanity to lend credence to his ideas of religion as a human construction emanating from within himself.

Sunday, April 20, 2008

A Look at Drama as Cosmic Redemption

I propose that the relationship of drama to the church should be one that is understood in terms of the role that the church has to play in the present age of God’s restoration of humankind; that is, what the church is and what its purpose is in light of the Trinitarian mission of cosmic redemption. It provides a context for allowing drama to function as a legitimate means of worship, evangelism and recreation all as a result of understanding it in terms of redemption.

In order to explore the use of drama in this redemptive capacity we must first survey the broad nature of God’s work in history. Then, once this is established, the specific nature of drama as redemptive work can be explored.

The whole of the Scriptures can be understood as an account of the Creator God revealing Himself to created man with the intention of His own glorification by means of cosmic redemption. It reveals that the God who created all and is in control of all wishes to establish with us, the dependant created creature, a lasting covenant – establishing with us a precedent for an understanding of ourselves in relation to God.

It is from this relationship that the human draws his entire existence (indeed, according to Colossians 1:17 it is from this relationship that all of the cosmos draws its initial existence and subsequent subsistence). In order to have a correct understanding of oneself and the world in which we live one must understand himself in light of humanity and his relationship to the Creator God. Then, understanding the broken nature of our relationship to that Creator God, we realize the importance of His covenant redemption. Which, upon entrance into the promise, by means of Christ’s sacrificial death, as established in His Holy Writ, provides for the human being a communal context in which to live, create, love, work and worship according to man’s reflection of the divine nature, and will one day result in the redemption of the whole cosmos as it is submitted to the supremacy of Christ, at which time God will deal justly with the forces of evil.

The Church then is an outworking of this cosmic intervention of the Trinitarian God, as is the mission of the church. In fact, theologian Jürgen Moltmann posits that mission does not come from the church but that the church is a result of Christ’s mission, and as a result functions as an extension of that mission. As the Son obeys the Father he glorifies the Father while the Father exalts and glorifies the Son. The Holy Spirit glorifies Christ in the world as well as unites the world with Christ – even as he does so he unites the Son and the Father (Moltmann 59).[1]

Thus the goal or mission of Christ/Holy Spirit is the redemption and reconciliation of the entire cosmos, of which the church is an integral part in the present age. Further, as we function in the body of believers as an extension of Christ so also our role in the world can be seen as an extension of this divine mission. This would cast the work of the believer in a way that should be seen as the redemption of human civilization, which is understood as a collective term generally embodying the sum of human relationships but more specifically refers to culture; that is, the traditions, institutions, and communal structures that form the context in which our consciousness is aware of existence, interacts with reality, and interprets all experiences.

The basis for drama in the church is in this way seen to be the Christians charge of cultural redemption. To many this might be the mere Christianizing of drama and the performing arts or “reclaiming the arts for Jesus.” However, while this may be a part of redeeming the dramatic arts there is a much deeper sense in which this can take place, one that can be understood biblically, theologically, relationally, and personally and finds it’s roots in the liturgical action of the Old Testament Israel.

In his article “Liturgy as Drama” Gordon Graham establishes that the idea of sacrifice was closely linked to the idea of “making holy.” This “making holy” via the sacrifice in the O.T. and the sacraments in the N.T. are ways that people can become reconciled to God. This becomes both more powerful and pertinent when the sacrifice is understood as a “religious action” or liturgy – primarily because this sacrifice becomes more than a symbolic manifestation of worship as a conscious act of self purification, an act of “making holy” (Graham 71).[2] Graham goes on to argue that participation in this liturgy (he uses communion as his example) is really a participation in a reflection of the cosmic salvation drama, and that we, as actors in this drama participate in this act of becoming holy (79).[3] Not only are we ourselves reconciled through this kind of participation in the divine nature, but so too is the world around us by our demonstration or as Michael Moynahan put in his article “Drama and the Word”, “This type of imaginative engagement is ultimately transforming” (Moynahan 72).[4]

This is not an in depth or exhaustive treatment of the subject, but if it causes us to think about ourselves and our work in terms of God and His work then it is a success.



[1] Moltmann, Jürgen. The Church in the Power of the Spirit. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
[2] Graham, Gordon. "Liturgy as Drama." Theology Today. 64.1 (Ap 2007): 71-79.
[3] Ibid., 79.
[4] Moynahan, Michael E. "Drama and the Word." Liturgical Ministry. 5 (Spr 1996): 70-78.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

musings on theological correlation.

I was recently writing a paper on my view of the creation narrative in Genesis. Part of the assignment was to discern what other areas of theology this would correlate to. So, this is what I came up with.

Coming to Genesis 1 understanding that this is an account of the Creator God revealing Himself to man, that this is God’s grand entrance into the newly begun story of mankind will provide us with a correlation for every aspect of our theology. It reveals that the God who created all and is in control of all wishes to establish with us, the dependent created creature, a lasting covenant – establishing with us a precedent for an understanding of ourselves in relation to God (the creator/creature relationship).

It is from this relationship that the human draws his entire existence (indeed, according to Colossians it is from this relationship that all of the cosmos draws its existence). In order to have a correct understanding of oneself and the world in which we live one must understand himself in light of humanity and his relationship to the Creator God (anthropology). Then, understanding the broken nature of our relationship to that Creator God, we realize the importance of His covenant redemption. Which, upon entrance into the promise, by means of Christ’s sacrificial death (soteriology), as established in His Holy Writ (bibliology), provides for the human being a communal context in which to live, create, love, work and worship according to man’s reflection of the divine nature (ecclesiology), and will one day result in the redemption of the whole cosmos as it is submitted to the supremacy of Christ, at which time God will deal justly with the forces of evil (eschatology).