Saturday, May 10, 2008

Feuerbach's Misinterpretation of Augustine: Part 2

Pelagianism and Augustinianism compared

As Feuerbach continues to make his case for his projection theology, he argues for the classic liberal notion of belief in the inherent goodness of humankind. Indeed, he must make such an argument; for without the idea that man in his essence is good, none of Feuerbach’s ensuing thought would be possible. It would be utterly illogical for him to argue for the “ultimate good” to be a projection of a decadent humanity.

Upon establishing that is sin a contradiction of the absolute considered as another being, and therefore having no meaning Feuerbach turns indirectly to a discussion of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. Rather than offer an outright refutation of Augustine’s arguments, he instead attempts to compare the Augustinian understanding of the depravity of man with the Pelagian doctrine that man is essentially good. But instead of finding the two to be opposed Feuerbach argues that both doctrines concerning the human beings moral nature vindicate the essential goodness of man; Augustinianism by means of religion and Pelagianism by means of rationalism.[1]

It almost seems ridiculous that Feuerbach would attempt to unify the two opposing doctrines of original sin. They possess fundamentally opposite presuppositions and are built off of completely distinct conceptions as to the nature of humanity. Feuerbach thought he could do so because of the nature of his anthropologically oriented theology. He undertook this mode of argumentation because if it is right and he is able to reduce these two opposing views into a single conclusion, then he is able to build a case for his projection God by making the “notion of God dependent on the notion of activity, or rather human activity, for he knows of none higher.”[2] This is possible according to Feuerbach because Pelagianism is reduced to forcing man into action and Augustinianism is reduced to forcing God into action, which means that God must either be completely passive or that he must act morally; and as has already been stated that if morally, then humanly.

Feuerbach then cites Augustine’s refutation of the Pelagian doctrine in “On Nature and Grace.” Feuerbach quotes Augustine, “Pelagianism denies God” because, he says, “It has only the Creator, i.e., Nature, as a basis, not the Saviour, the true God of the religious sentiment… it denies God… it elevates man into a God since it makes him a being not needing God.”[3] Feuerbach then inverts this reasoning for Augustinianism saying, “Augustinianism denies man; but, as a consequence of this, it reduces God to the level of man, even to the ignominy of the cross, for the sake of man.”[4] Using either of these systems will warrant the same conclusion; the idea that either man is God or God is man. Indeed, Feuerbach goes on to say, “What a man declares concerning God, he in truth declares concerning himself.”[5] Then, thinking his argument complete he says, “…so long as a man adores a good being as his God, so long does he contemplate in God the goodness of his own nature.”[6]

But this is not at all the meaning that Augustine intended. When he critiqued Pelagianism and declared that “Pelagianism denies God” he did not mean that this denial literally cause man to ascend to godhood based upon his lack of need for a God figure. Instead he was referring to the fact that as Pelagianism denied the depravity of man he also denied the need for a Savior. Once Christ’s atoning work on the cross is reduced to example it becomes the responsibility of the individual to achieve the moral perfection God requires to enter into relationship with him. What is left is a works based system of salvation, which violates the biblical text (Eph. 2:8-9).

Counter to Feuerbach’s inferences, Augustine’s doctrine of the total depravity of man does not encourage the believer to live a life of complete religious non-action. As has already been demonstrated Augustine is concerned with redemptive living as he strives towards participation in God and the pinnacle of existence as the “greatest good.” This basic understanding of Christianity opposes Feuerbach’s interpretation and attempted synthesis of his thought with Pelagianism.

Based upon the situation of this passage in Feuerbach’s larger manifesto it seems as though this discussion were almost unnaturally inserted. There is no evidence to warrant this notion, however it would fit if Feuerbach is trying to provide his new thought with frames that people will easily recognize and understand.

Saint Augustine has been a pillar for Western theology for centuries, and as such his work has been oft called upon to lend credence to the ideas of numerous subsequent theologians and religious thinkers. Feuerbach’s treatment of the Augustinian text is certainly a unique example of this. However, Feuerbach fails to take into account his own certain presuppositions; those being, that humanity is essentially good, that the senses are the way that we validate existence, and that notions of God must be reflective of humanity.



[1] Feuerbach, 28.

[2] Feuerbach, 29.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

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